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Abstract
In a recent paper, Jaggi et al. [12], presented a distributed polynomial-time rate-optimal network-
coding scheme that works in the presence of Byzantine faults. We revisit their adversarial models and
augment them with three, arguably realistic, models. In each of the models, we present a distributed
scheme that demonstrates the usefulness of the model. In particular, all of the schemes obtain optimal
rate C − z, where C is the network capacity and z is a bound on the number of links controlled by the
adversary.
1 Introduction
Network coding is a powerful paradigm for network communication. In “traditional” networks, internal
nodes simply transmit packets that arrive to them (without any substantial change of their content). In
contrast, when performing network coding, internal nodes of the network are allowed to mix the information
from different packets they receive before transmitting on outgoing edges. This mixing may substantially
improve the throughput of a network, it can be done in a distributed manner with low complexity, and is
robust to packet losses and network failures, e.g., [1, 17, 15, 13, 8].
The focus of this paper is network coding for multicast networks (where a single sender wants to trans-
mit the same information to several receivers), at the presence of Byzantine network faults. A Byzantine
adversary that may maliciously introduce erroneous messages into a network may be especially disruptive
when network coding is applied. The simple reason is that any message (including the faulty ones) affect
all messages on its path to the recipient. Therefore, a single faulty message may contaminate many more
messages down the line.
Motivated by the above difficulty, there has been some work on detecting and correcting Byzantine
faults. We distinguish between computationally unbounded and computationally bounded adversaries. For
computationally unbounded Byzantine adversaries, error detection was first addressed in [9]. This was
followed by the work of Cai and Yeung [18, 2], who generalize standard bounds on error-correcting codes to
networks, without providing any explicit algorithms for achieving these bounds. Jaggi et al. [11], consider an
information-theoretically rate-optimal solution to Byzantine attacks, which however requires a centralized
design. Finally, a distributed polynomial-time rate-optimal network-coding scheme was recently obtained
(independently) by Jaggi et al. [12] and Koetter and Kschischang [14]. Error detection for multicast network
coding in the presence of computationally bounded Byzantine adversaries was also considered in the past
[16, 4, 3]. In these works various authentication schemes are performed at internal nodes of the network.
∗Computer Science Division, The Open University of Israel, Raanana, 43107, Israel. lnutman@gmail.com
†Computer Science Division, The Open University of Israel, Raanana, 43107, Israel. mikel@openu.ac.il
1
In [16, 4] a centralized trusted authority is assumed to provide hashes of the original packets to each node
in the network, [3] obviates the need for a trusted entity under the assumption that the majority of packets
received at terminal nodes is uncorrupted.
This paper builds on the scheme of [12] to obtain distributed polynomial-time rate-optimal network-
coding schemes in three realistic adversarial models. Our schemes, as well as those of [12] assume no
knowledge of the topology of the network and follow the distributed network coding protocol of [8]. Namely,
their implementation involves only a slight modification of the source and destination while the internal
nodes can continue to use the standard protocol of [8]. Before we mention our contribution in detail, we
present a brief description of the adversarial models studied in [12]. In the following informal summary, a
sender named ‘Alice’ is interested in the transmission of information to a group of receivers named ‘Bob’
over a given network. The Byzantine adversary, ‘Calvin’, controls some of the links of the network and
injects erroneous messages into the network in aim to corrupt the communication between Alice and Bob.
Omniscient adversary model: In this model Calvin is all-powerful and all-knowing, and is limited only by
the number of links z under his control. [12] obtained a network coding scheme with optimal rate for this
model of C − 2z, where C is the network capacity.
Secret channel model: This model allows Alice to send to Bob a short (low rate) secret, which is completely
hidden from Calvin (who is again all-powerful and all-knowing (excluding the secret), and is limited by the
number of links z under his control). [12] obtained a network coding scheme with optimal rate of C − z for
this model. Notice that the rate achievable in this model is strictly higher than that in the Omniscient model.
This secret channel model was originally referred to in [12] as the ‘shared secret model’. We rename it here
to secret channel model as the secret shared in this model between Alice and Bob may depend on Alice’s
message. We elaborate on this point in detail shortly.
Limited eavesdropping model: The last model, which is the least relevant to our work, limits the number
of links on which Calvin can eavesdrop (it was originally named “limited adversary model” and we rename
it here for concreteness). In this model [12, 10] obtained a network coding scheme with rate C − z, as long
as Calvin can eavesdrop on at most C − z links (in addition to the z links under his complete control).
Our Contribution
In this work we introduce three additional adversarial models, and give optimal rate efficient distributed
network-coding schemes in each of the models. As mentioned above, our schemes (as well as those of [12])
assume no knowledge of the topology of the network and follow the distributed network coding protocol of
[8]. Roughly speaking, we obtain an optimal rate of C − z on all the adversarial models described below
(the optimality of our schemes follow, e.g., from [11]).
Random-Secret Model: The first model we present is the random secret model in which Alice and Bob
share a short (uniformly distributed) random secret which is completely hidden from Calvin. Calvin is all-
powerful and all-knowing (excluding the secret), and is limited by the number of links z under his control.
This model differs from the ‘secret channel’ model discussed in [12] in the sense that the secret that is shared
by Alice and Bob is not constructed as a function of Alice’s message, but rather is uniformly distributed and
independent of Alice’s message. The independence of the secret shared by Alice and Bob from the actual
message M being transmitted by Alice has several advantages. This allows Alice and Bob to share their
secret prior to the act of communicating M . For example, one may consider the scenario where Alice and
Bob are able to meet (or communicate) in advance and share a large source of completely random bits (such
as a CD of uniformly generated bits). As long as these bits are unknown to Calvin, they can be used overtime
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to communicate at high rate over the network (without the need of an additional low rate channel connecting
Alice and Bob). Moreover, as we will see shortly, communication in this model sets the foundations for
communicating at high rate in the setting in which Calvin is computationally bounded (more specifically, in
the symmetric key cryptographic setting). We would like to note that in the scheme of [12] for their ‘secret
channel’ model, the secret information that Alice and Bob share indeed strongly depends on the message M
Alice transmits to Bob and hence cannot extend naturally to the examples mentioned above.
For the random secret model we obtain a network coding scheme with optimal rate of C−z. Our scheme
is obtained by a transformation of the scheme of [12] for the secret channel model. In our proof we do not
need to get into the finer details of the original scheme and instead observe and exploit a useful property of
the original secret composition.
Causal-Omniscient Model: As in the Omniscient model of [12], in this model we assume Calvin is all-
powerful and all-knowing, and is again limited by the number of links z under his control. However, to
obtain rate greater than C − 2z, we slightly restrict Calvin. Namely, we assume that Calvin is causal.
Specifically, when Calvin injects messages into the network at time step t, he only has access to messages
sent by Alice at time steps at most t + ∆. Here, ∆ is some parameter of the network which is considered
small compared with the length of the communication stream.
We present an optimal rate distributed network coding scheme for this model. Just as in the omniscient
adversary model, our scheme requires C > 2z. However, in such a case we obtain a rate of C−z (compared
with C− 2z in the omniscient adversary model). Our scheme is obtained by a fully modular composition of
two network coding schemes from [12]: one for the omniscient adversary model and the other for the secret
channel model. The study of the causal-omniscient model will set the foundations for communicating at high
rate in yet an additional setting in which Calvin is computationally bounded, the public key cryptographic
setting.
We would like to note that causal adversaries were also implicitly studied in [11] in the centralized
setting, while in this work we focus on the distributed setting. Nevertheless, the upper bounds proven in
[11] imply that the requirement of C > 2z is necessary (otherwise no information can be transmitted).
Computationally-Bounded Adversary Model: While our previous models did not make any computa-
tional assumptions on the parties involved, we now turn to study the case in which Calvin is computationally
bounded (as before Calvin is all-knowing, excluding any secret keys, and limited by the number of links z
under his control). In this setting, we present two results. The first result uses the notion of symmet-
ric key cryptography and is based on our random secret model. Roughly speaking, in the case Calvin is
computationally bounded, one may replace the random secret in the random secret model, by a series of
pseudo-random bits: bits that would still look completely random (i.e., uniform) to Calvin. Now, to gen-
erate an (effectively) unlimited amount of shared pseudo-random bits, to be used in several executions of
the random secret protocol, all Alice and Bob need to do is exchange a single short secret key prior to the
communication process. This single key, and the bits it generates may be used over essentially unlimited
time to communicate at high rate.
The second result addresses the public key cryptographic setting. In this setting, each of the parties,
Alice and Bob, hold a pair of keys: a private key (known only to itself) and a public key (known to all
— including Calvin). Encrypted point to point communication between Alice and Bob can be done using
these public and private keys; without Alice and Bob ever meeting in advance to exchange a shared secret
key. However, in the model we study, no point to point channel is available - and Alice would like to
communicate at high rate to Bob over a given network. We present a network coding scheme for the model
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at hand. Our scheme is based on the scheme we present for the causal-omniscience model, with the sole
difference that public-key encryption is used to hide some of Alice’s information from Calvin.
As common in the study of cryptographic primitives, both our results are conditional — in the sense
that they hold assuming that certain cryptographic primitives exist (such as the assumption that factoring is
hard). Under such assumptions, we prove in the symmetric key setting that our scheme obtains an optimal
rate of C − z, and in the (weaker) public key setting we obtain the same optimal rate under the condition
that C > 2z. In this model Calvin is no longer causal, however, as in the causal-omniscient model, it can be
seen that the upper bounds of [11] imply that the latter requirement of C > 2z is necessary.
We note that in the public key scenario, we assume that Alice knows Bob’s public key. For this reason,
the public-key model seems particularly suitable in settings where cryptography is already involved (e.g.,
to ensure privacy and integrity of the communication). In such a scenario, a public-key infrastructure may
already be available and computational limitations on the adversary are usually already assumed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the model definitions and nota-
tion. Sections 3, 4 and 5 discuss the three new models and schemes presented above.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we give the definitions and notation that are required to model network coding in various
adversarial models. Our definitions and notation mostly follow [12].
Network Model The network will be modelled as a graph. We assume our graphs are acyclic, and the
communication over them is done in a synchronous manner. Namely, in each time step a single packet of
information can traverse an edge of the network.
Network-coding schemes We will consider the task of routing information over the network from a single
sender Alice to multiple receivers Bob (the setting of multicast). In fact, in our analysis, it will usually be
sufficient to consider a single receiver Bob. The reason is that in the schemes we suggest, neither Alice
nor the network need to be aware of the location of Bob in the network. Therefore, it will be possible to
extend each one of our schemes from the case of a single receiver to the case of multiple receivers (this state
of affairs is common in the study of multicast network coding, e.g. [12]). We will therefore continue the
formalization, assuming a single receiver (and will address the setting of multicast separately for each one
of our schemes).
We will not assume that Alice, Bob or any other internal node is aware of the network topology or of the
location of Alice and Bob in the network. The network topology will only influence the maximal achievable
rate. A network-coding scheme is defined by Alice’s encoder, Bob’s decoder, and the coding performed in
internal nodes. We will now discuss those three components.
Let M be the message Alice wishes to transmit to Bob. The encoding algorithm of Alice adds some
redundancy into the message, thus obtaining an encoded message X. This information is routed through the
network, where it is further encoded (as a result of the network coding). Bob receives encoded information
that may also encompass network faults. Bob’s decoding algorithm, applied to the encoded information, is
supposed to factor out the network faults and retrieve the original message M .
It is convenient to assume that Alice’s encoded message X is represented by a b×n matrix, where every
entry of the matrix is an element from a finite field Fq. We refer to a column as a slice, to a row as a packet,
and to each entry as a symbol. It is also useful to note that in all of the schemes of [12], as well as ours, X
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is composed of the original message M , and in addition some δn slices of redundancy. In other words, the
size of M is (1− δ) that of X.
The specific coding performed by internal nodes is less relevant to our work, as it is inherited without
change from [12]. For concreteness, let us mention that internal nodes, as well as Alice herself, perform
random linear network coding a la [8]. Namely, for each of its outgoing links, a node selects random
coefficients of a linear transformation over Fq (the number of coefficients is b for Alice and equals the
indegree for any internal node). The network coding of each of the slices of X goes as follows: First Alice
sends on each of her out-going edges the corresponding linear transformation of the symbols in the slice.
Whenever an internal node receives a symbol on each of its incoming edges (which is in itself a linear
transformation of the slice’s symbols), it sends on its outgoing edges the corresponding transformation of
those symbols. As common in the literature of network coding, as our graphs are acyclic, we assume
that information from different slices is not mixed throughout the communication process. This can be
established by sufficient memory at internal nodes of the network.
Adversarial Model Each one of the adversarial models we consider in this paper is specified by the exact
power of the adversary Calvin. We mention here the common properties of Calvin.
Calvin has under his control z network’s links of his choice.1 On these links Calvin may inject his own
packets, disguised as part of the information flow from Alice to Bob. Calvin succeeds if Bob decodes a
message different than Alice’s original M . The goal of the network-coding scheme is to ensure this only
happens with very small probability while maximizing the rate in which information flows from Alice to
Bob.
We do not assume that Alice, Bob or any internal node are aware of the links under Calvin’s control. On
the other hand, Calvin has full knowledge of the network topology as well as the identity of Alice and Bob.
In all of our models we assume that Calvin has full eavesdropping capabilities (i.e., Calvin can monitor the
entire communication on each one of the links). Calvin knows the encoding and decoding schemes of Alice
and Bob, and the network code implemented by the internal nodes (including the random linear coefficients).
Furthermore, in our proofs, we assume that Calvin selects the message M that Alice transmits. This ensures
that our schemes work for every message M Alice sends to Bob.
The network capacity, denoted by C , is the maximum number of symbols that can be delivered on
average, per time step, from Alice to Bob, assuming no adversarial interference (i.e., the max flow of infor-
mation from Alice to Bob). The network capacity is known to equal the min-cut from Alice to Bob. (For the
corresponding multicast case, C equals the minimum of the min-cuts over all destinations.) For a message
M , the error probability e(M) is the probability that Bob reconstructs a message different from Alice’s
message M . The (maximum) error probability of the encoding scheme is defined to be e = maxM{e(M)}
(Here the maximization is taken over the message M of Alice). The rate is the number of information
symbols that can be delivered on average, per time step, from Alice to Bob . In the parameters above, the
rate equals (1− δ) · b (recall that δ is the fraction of redundant slices). Rate R is said to be achievable if for
any α > 0 and ǫ > 0 there exists a coding scheme of block length n with rate ≥ R−α and error probability
e ≤ ǫ.
1The parameter z represents Calvin’s power. It is possible to define z as the min cut between Calvin’s links and Bob. This is at
most, but may be strictly smaller than the number of links under Calvin’s control.
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2.1 Building Blocks of our Schemes
Our network-coding schemes rely on the schemes of [12], given in two adversarial models: the omniscient
adversary model and the secret channel model. We discuss those schemes here.
2.1.1 A scheme in the omniscient-adversary model
In the omniscient adversary model, we put no restrictions on the knowledge and ability of Calvin (see
discussion in Section 2). In this model, [12] gave a distributed polynomial-time scheme Aomn, and proved
for it the following theorem:
Theorem 2.1 ([12]) Aomn achieves a rate of C − 2z, in the omniscient-adversary model, with code-
complexity O((nC)3).
2.1.2 A scheme in the secret-channel model
In the secret channel model, we assume that Alice can secretly send Bob a (short) message that is completely
hidden from Calvin. We put no additional restrictions on the knowledge and ability of Calvin (see discussion
in Section 2). In this model, [12] gave a distributed polynomial-time scheme Asc, and proved for it the
following theorem:
Theorem 2.2 ([12]) Asc achieves a rate of C − z, in the secret-channel model, with code-complexity
O(nC2). The communication on the secret channel consists of at most C2 +C symbols.
In Section 3, we give some more details on the way the secret message is defined in Asc.
2.2 Proof techniques: reduction and worst case analysis
A scheme is said to be (information theoretically) secure against an adversarial entity Calvin, if for any
behavior of Calvin, Alice is able to communicate her information to Bob (with high probability). Loosely
speaking, we think of Calvin as an algorithmic procedure, which given certain inputs (such as the network
topology, Alice’s information and the network code applied by the network), computes which edges in the
network to corrupt and which error message to transmit.
There are several proof paradigms that can be used in an attempt to establish the correctness of a given
coding scheme. In this work, the correctness of our coding schemes will be proven by means of reduc-
tion. Namely, we build upon the results of [12], and prove that any adversarial entity Calvin that breaks our
schemes will imply an additional adversary (usually referred to as Calvin’) that will not allow communica-
tion in one of the schemes presented in [12].
More specifically, our proofs can be outlined as follows. We first define our coding schemes. We will
then assume for sake of contradiction that they are not secure. As we would like our schemes to be secure
for any message M of Alice, this will imply the existence of an adversary Calvin that first chooses which
message M Alice should send to Bob, and then is able to corrupt the communication of M between Alice
and Bob. Thinking of Calvin as an algorithmic procedure, we show how to define the additional adversary
Calvin’ — which is a procedure based on Calvin. Finally we show that Calvin’ is able to break one of the
(provably secure) schemes presented in [12] — this suffices to conclude our proof.
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3 Random-Secret Model
The random-secret model is similar to the secret-channel model of [12] with the difference that the secret
information sent from Alice to Bob should be random and independent of Alice’s input message M . For-
mally, we allow Alice to share with Bob a short secret (which is uniformly distributed). This secret will stay
hidden from Calvin.
Alice’s secret and message encoding in Asc Recall that Asc is the scheme presented in [12] for commu-
nication in the secret-channel model. We will show how to transform Asc to a comparable scheme which
works in the random secret model. The only ingredients of Asc we need to recall is the structure of Alice’s
secret and of Alice’s encoder. The encoding of M into X is very simple: We assume that Alice’s message
M is a b × (n − b) matrix over Fq. The matrix X is M concatenated with the b × b identity matrix, I .
Namely, X = [M I].
Alice’s secret message is computed in two steps. She first chooses C parity symbols uniformly at random
from the field Fq. The parity symbols are labelled rd, for d ∈ {1, . . . , C}. We denote by R the vector of
parity symbols. Corresponding to the parity symbols, Alice’s parity-check matrix P is defined as the n×C
matrix whose (i, j)th entry equals (rj)i, i.e., rj taken to the ith power. The second part of Alice’s secret
message is the b × C hash matrix H , computed as the matrix product X · P . The secret message sent by
Alice to Bob on the secret channel is composed of both R and H . As n ≤ C , we indeed have a secret of at
most C2 + C symbols.
A useful property of Asc Note that the vector R of Alice’s secret is already uniform and independent
of the message M . On the other hand, the hash H is a deterministic function of R and M (given by the
equation H = X ·P ). Our main observation (which we will prove below) is the following: for almost every
value of R, when M is uniform then H is uniform as well. Furthermore, it is enough that a small chunk of
M will be uniform to guarantee the uniformity of H . This suggests the following idea: instead of selecting
H as a function of Alice’s message, we can select both R and H uniformly at random. Later, Alice can
tweak the message a bit such that we indeed get H = X · P . We continue to formalizing this idea.
3.1 Defining the new scheme Ars
We now show how to transform Asc into a scheme Ars with comparable performance in the random secret
model. To define the scheme we now define the random secret, Alice’s encoder, Bob’s decoding, and the
coding in internal nodes.
The random secret The secret shared between Alice and Bob is composed of a length-C vector R over
Fq and a b×C matrix H over Fq. Both are selected uniformly at random (and independently of each other).
Even though R and H are selected uniformly, their function in Ars is identical to the function of R and
H inAsc. We therefore use the same notation as given above. In particular, we refer to H as the hash matrix.
The elements of R are referred to as the parity symbols and denoted rd, for d ∈ {1, . . . , C}. Furthermore,
we define the corresponding parity-check matrix P as before.
Alice’s encoder We allow Alice to encode a slightly shorter input message M assumed to be b×(n−b−C)
matrix over Fq. Alice encodes M into a b× n matrix X = [L M I], where L is a b×C matrix and I is the
b× b identity matrix. The matrix L is defined (arbitrarily) such that H = X · P . We show shortly that this
system of linear equations (on the elements of L) will have a unique solution with high probability over H
and P . If this system has no solution or more than a single solution we define L arbitrarily (say, to be the
all-zero matrix).
Network coding and Bob’s decoder Both the network coding and Bob’s decoder are defined in the same
way as in Asc [12]. Once Bob decodes a matrix [L¯ M¯ ], Bob discards of the b×C prefix L¯ and outputs M¯ .
3.2 Properties of Ars
We now state and prove the properties of Ars that are almost identical to those of Asc:
Theorem 3.1 Ars is a distributed polynomial-time scheme. Ars achieves a rate of C − z, in the random-
secret model, with code-complexity O(nC2). The random secret consists of at most C2 + C symbols.
Proof: We will prove that the probability that Bob decodes correctly in Ars is almost identical to the
probability that Bob decodes correctly inAsc. The theorem will then follow immediately from the definition
of Ars and from Theorem 2.2. We note that even though Alice is able to send to Bob a little bit less
information in Ars than in Asc (specifically, Alice sends b · C fewer elements of Fq), the rate in both
schemes is identical (as we consider the rate as n goes to infinity).
Let us consider an adversary Calvin that makes Ars fail with probability ǫ. In particular, Calvin may
chose a message M for Alice to send s.t. with probability ǫ, Bob reconstructs M¯ which is different than M .
We will define an adversary Calvin’ that makes Asc fail with probability ǫ′ ≥ ǫ−C2/q. This will conclude
our proof.
Calvin’ is defined as follows. First Calvin’ imitates the message selection of Calvin (namely, Calvin’
uses the message M ′ Calvin would have chosen given the topology and the code of the network). If Calvin
sets Alice’s input to the message M then Calvin’ sets Alice’s input to M ′ = [LM ], where L is a uniformly
chosen b×C matrix. Then Calvin’ continues to mimic Calvin, and behaves identically (in particular Calvin’
sends the same messages as Calvin would on the same corrupted links).
As we see, Calvin’ tries to fail Asc by mimicking an attack of Calvin on the execution of Ars. The
success of Calvin’s attack on the execution of Ars depends both on the message X = [L M I] transmitted
by Alice and the secret information R,H shared by Alice and Bob. Let D be the distribution over triplets
(R,H,L) obtained when R and H are selected uniformly at random (and independently of each other) and
the matrix L is defined to satisfy H = X ·P if a single such L exists, and is defined to be the all-zero matrix
otherwise. Let A be the set of triplets (R,H,L) on which Calvin’s attack succeeds (here we are assuming
Calvin to be a deterministic adversary, however our analysis extends naturally to the case in which Calvin
may act based on random decisions also). Namely, the success probability of Calvin can be formalized as
Pr[A], where the probability is over the distribution D.
Now consider the success probability of Calvin’ on Asc averaged over messages of the form M ′ =
[L M ] (where L is chosen at random). As before this probability depends on the message X = [L M I]
sent by Alice and by the information R,H shared by Alice and Bob. Let D′ be the distribution over triplets
(R,H,L) obtained when R and L are selected uniformly at random (and independently of each other) and
H is defined to be X · P . Recall that Calvin’ mimics the behavior of Calvin, thus Calvin’ succeeds on the
triplet (R,H,L) iff Calvin succeeds on (R,H,L). Hence, the average success probability of Calvin over
messages of the form M ′ = [LM ] can be formalized as Pr[A], where the probability is now overD′. Notice
that the subset A of triplets (R,H,L) is the set used above in the discussion on Ars.
In what follows we show that D and D′ are almost identical. This will suffice to prove our assertion.
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Definition 3.2 The event Ebad on R happens either if one of the parity symbols is selected to be zero or if
any two of the parity symbols are identical. In other words, Ebad happens if there exists d ∈ {1, . . . , C}
such that rd = 0, or if for two distinct d, d′ ∈ {1, . . . , C}, we have that rd = r′d.
Note that Ebad is defined both for D and for D
′
. In both cases, R is uniformly distributed. Therefore
PrD[Ebad] = PrD′ [Ebad]. Furthermore, it is easy to argue that this probability is at most C
2/q (simply,
each of the C parity symbols is zero or identical to a previously selected parity symbol with probability at
most C/q). We are now able to formalize our main observation:
Lemma 3.3 Conditioned on Ebad not happening, the two distributions D and D
′ are identical.
Proof: (of lemma) Let us fix any value of M . Let us also fix any value of R such that Ebad does not happen.
We will show that conditioned on every such fixings, the distributions D and D′ are identical.
Let us decompose the n×C parity-check matrix P into a C×C matrix V and an (n−C)×C matrix P ′,
such that P =
[
V
P ′
]
. By the definition of P , the matrix V is the Van der Monde matrix that corresponds
to the parity symbols in R. Since we assumed that Ebad does not happen, we have that the parity symbols
are all distinct and non zero. Therefore V is invertible.
With this notation, we can rewrite the equation H = X · P as follows:
H = [L M I] ·
[
V
P ′
]
= L · V + [M I] · P ′.
Since we already fixed M and R, we have that [M I] · P ′ is a fixed matrix, which we will denote as
H ′. We also have that V is a fixed invertible matrix. We denote by V −1 its inverse. Now we have that
H = L · V + H ′, or alternatively that L = (H −H ′) · V −1. We can conclude that for every value of H
there is exactly one value of L for which H = X · P . We therefore have that the equation H = X · P
forces a one-to-one correspondence between the values of L and the values of H . Therefore, the uniform
distribution over L induces the uniform distribution over H and vise versa. The lemma follows.
Recall that we defined A be the set of triplets (R,H,L) on which Calvin’s attack succeeds. It follows
from the lemma that conditioned on Ebad not happening, Pr[A] is identical under D and D
′
. Since we
already argued that PrD[Ebad] = PrD′ [Ebad] ≤ C
2/q, we can conclude that the probability that Ebad does
not happen and A does happen is at least ǫ−C2/q (regardless of whether the probability is taken over D or
D′). We can finally conclude that Calvin’ succeeds in failing Asc with probability at least ǫ− C2/q.
The case of multicast In the above description of Ars, we considered for simplicity the case of a single
Bob. In the setting of multicast, there are two possible scenarios. First, it may be the case that Alice and
each of the Bobs share the same random secret. Ars extends to this scenario with no change (simply because
Ars completely ignores the location of Bob in the network). We now address the more general scenario,
where Alice may share a different secret with each one of the Bobs.
Our main observation is that almost all of the information Alice transmits (the matrix X) is independent
of the random secret. The only part of X that does depend on the secret is the matrix L. This matrix is rather
small and its size is independent of the block-length n. Therefore to extend Ars to the setting of multicast,
all we need to do is to have Alice send a different matrix Li for each of the secrets she shares. Since the
number of Bobs is bounded by the size of the graph, this only results in negligible rate loss. To decode, each
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one of the Bobs ignores the communication which relates to other secrets and only keeps the communication
related to his Li. Bob then decodes exactly as in Ars.
It remains to argue that with high probability each one of the Bobs will decode Alice’s message M
correctly. Let us consider Calvin’s attempt to fail the receiver Bob whose secret corresponds to the matrix
Li. Our previous analysis implies that each one of the matrices Lj for j 6= i are with high probability
uniform and independent of both Li and M . Therefore, these additional matrices cannot assist Calvin in the
attempt to fail this particular Bob. We conclude that each of the receivers will decode correctly with high
probability, and therefore all of them are likely to decode correctly.
Remark 3.4 In the above we assumed that the secret shared between Alice and each receiver Bob includes
the index i, such that Li corresponds to their shared secret. It is possible to avoid this assumption as follows:
(1) Let the random secret between Alice and Bob also contain a random (almost pair-wise independent) hash
function gi. Alice augments the message M with gi(M) for all of those hash functions gi. (2) Continue as
before and have Bob decode according to each of the Lj’s (as now we assume that Bob does not know i
such that Li corresponds to his secret). Some of these decodings may result in M¯ 6= M . But with very high
probability none of the erroneous decodings will be authenticated by a correct hash gi(M¯) (as for every M
and M¯ we have that gi(M¯ ) is almost uniform and independent of gi(M)).
4 Causal-Omniscient Model
Recall that in our model of communication, the columns of the matrix X (namely, each slice of information
from X) is encoded independently over time. Given the network’s latencies (the number of steps it takes for
a message to traverse the network), we have that while an internal node v sends messages that correspond to
the tth column of X, Alice may already be sending messages that correspond to column t′ > t. Therefore,
in the model in which Calvin can eavesdrop on all links, it inherently has a “pick into the future”. Namely,
when sending messages which correspond to the tth column of X, we assume that Calvin knows all the
columns of X up to column t+∆, where ∆ is some fixed parameter of the network. It is not hard to verify
that ∆ is at most the size of the edge set E. However, it may be the case that Calvin does not necessarily
know any later columns of X. This motivates the definition of the Causal-Omniscient model.
In the Causal-Omniscient model, Calvin has unlimited computational power. He has under his control
z network links of his choice. On these links Calvin may inject his own packets, disguised as part of the
information flow from Alice to Bob. We do not assume that Alice, Bob or any internal nodes are aware of
the links under Calvin’s control. On the other hand, Calvin has full knowledge of the network topology as
well as the identity of Alice and Bob. Calvin has full eavesdropping capabilities (i.e., Calvin can monitor
the entire communication on each one of the links). Calvin knows the encoding and decoding schemes
of Alice and Bob, and the network code implemented by the internal nodes (including the random linear
coefficients). Furthermore, we assume that Calvin knows which message M Alice is sending to Bob.
The only limitation on Calvin is the following: while Calvin is allowed access to the internal state and
randomness of all parties, he does not get such access to Alice’s state and randomness. Note that such
a limitation is implicit in all other limited adversarial models considered here and in [12].2 The desired
implication of this limitation for the Causal-Omniscient model is the following: let ∆ be a fixed parameter
of the network that specifies a bound on the latency of the network. By the discussion above, if Calvin’s
2For example, in the random-secret model, one has to hide the secret-key which is expressed in various computations of both
Alice and Bob.
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messages correspond to columns of X up to its tth column then we assume that all columns beyond column
number t+∆ are hidden from Calvin.
4.1 The scheme Aco
We now define the scheme Aco for the Causal-Omniscient model. The scheme is obtained by a completely
modular composition of two schemes: A scheme Asc in the secret-channel model, and a scheme Aomn in
the omniscient-adversary model. See more details on the schemes in Section 2. The idea of the composition
is simple: first Alice, Bob (and the network) execute Asc with Alice’s input M , but without Alice sending
the message on the secret channel (simply because a secret channel is not available in this model). Unfor-
tunately, without the secret message, Bob cannot decode M correctly yet. Therefore, to transmit this secret
information, we suggest that Alice and Bob execute Aomn with the secret message as Alice’s new input.
Unfortunately, Aomn may reveal the secret message to Calvin as well. Our simple observation is that as
long as the secret message is revealed after the execution of Asc ends, it is too late for Calvin to cause any
harm. Therefore, all that we need (so that Aco works) is for Alice to send ∆ “garbage” columns between
the executions of Asc and of Aomn. We turn to a formal definition of Aco:
Alice’s encoder Alice invokes the encoding and secret generating algorithms of Asc on her input M .
Denote by XM the output of the encoding and S the message to be sent on the secret channel. Now Alice
invokes an independent execution of the encoding algorithm Aomn on S as input. Denote by XS the output
of the encoding. For reasons that will be made clear shortly, Alice encodes a secret S such that XS will be
of block length nS = (n/C)1/3 (here n is the block length of our scheme and C is the capacity). Recall,
that the size of S (and thus the block length of XS) in the secret channel scheme is independent of n and
significantly smaller than nS . Hence, such a blowup in the size of XS can be obtained for example by an
arbitrary padding of S with irrelevant information. As we will see, this blowup will enable our scheme
to have a low probability of error (without significantly increasing the code-complexity). As nS is much
smaller than n, our rate remains optimal. Alice’s encoder now outputs X = [XM 0 XS ], where 0 denotes
the zero matrix with ∆ columns.
Network coding As in Asc and Aomn, the network coding is the standard random-linear coding of [8].
Bob’s decoding Bob first uses the decoder of Aomn on the suffix of the communication (which corre-
sponds to the columns of XS). Denote by S¯ the decoded message. Bob now applies the decoder of Asc on
the prefix of the communication (which corresponds to the columns of XM ), with the (relevant parts of the)
secret message set to S¯. Bob outputs the decoded message, which we denote by M¯ .
4.2 Properties of Aco
We state the parameters obtained by Aco in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.1 Aco is a distributed polynomial-time scheme. Aco achieves a rate of C − z, as long as
C > 2z, in the Causal-Omniscient model, with code-complexity O(nC2).
Proof: Most of the properties of Aco follow from the related properties of Asc and Aomn, as given by
Theorems 2.2 and 2.1. The restriction that C > 2z guarantees positive rate for Aomn (as the rate of Aomn
is C−2z). Other than that, Aco inherits its rate from Asc. There is some loss of rate inAco (compared with
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Asc) due to the communication related to the zero columns and to XS . Nevertheless, this loss is negligible
as n tends to infinity. The choice of nS (the block length of XS), guarantees that the code complexity due
to both building blocks (Asc and Aomn) will equal O(nC2).
It remains to bound the error probability ǫ of Aco. Obviously, ǫ ≤ ǫ1 + ǫ2, where ǫ1 is the probability
that S¯ 6= S while ǫ2 is the probability that S¯ = S but M¯ 6= M . It follows that ǫ1 is bounded by the error
probability of Aomn when applied to messages of block length nS that corresponds to XS . In [12] this
error is shown to be vanishing as the block length tends to infinity (note that when n tends to infinity so
does nS = (n/C)1/3). To bound ǫ2 notice that Calvin does not get access to XS until he is done corrupting
XM . Thus ǫ2 is bounded by the error probability of Asc when applied to messages of block length that
correspond to XM . As the block length of XM is proportional to n, we conclude our assertion.
Remark 4.2 While we described Aco for the case of a single Bob, it also applies with no change to the
setting of multicast (simply because Aco completely ignores the location of Bob in the network, and there
is nothing that distinguishes one Bob from the other).
5 Computationally-Bounded Adversary Model
In this section we consider a limitation of a different flavor on the strength of the adversary Calvin. Namely,
we assume that Calvin is computationally bounded. Assuming so allows us to employ powerful crypto-
graphic tools. The two results in this section correspond to cryptographic tools that are applicable in two
different settings: (1) Symmetric-key cryptography (discussed in Section 5.1), and (2) Public-key cryptog-
raphy (discussed in Section 5.2). As common in the study of cryptographic primitives, both our results are
conditional — in the sense that they hold assuming that certain cryptographic primitives exist (such as the
assumption that factoring is hard).
Note that apart from the computational limitations on Calvin his powers are intact. In particular, Calvin
has full eavesdropping capabilities and has full knowledge of the network topology as well as the identity of
Alice and Bob. Calvin knows the encoding and decoding schemes of Alice and Bob, and the network code
implemented by the internal nodes (including the random linear coefficients).
5.1 Symmetric-key cryptography
Recall our scheme Ars in the random secret model. Assuming that Alice and Bob share a short random
secret, this scheme allows them to communicate a significant amount of information which is specified by
the block length n. Unfortunately, Bob will only be able to decode Alice’s message after receiving the entire
block of communication. Therefore, it is natural to assume that every time slot (e.g., every hour or every
day, depending on the rate of communication), Alice and Bob would like to terminate the previous execution
of Ars and to start a new execution. Let S1, S2, . . . Sℓ be the sequence of secrets used in these executions.
In general, the secrets should be independent of each other, which implies that Alice and Bob may need to
share a long secret if they communicate over a long period of time.
In the Computationally-Bounded Adversary model, Alice and Bob can execute Ars many times while
still only exchanging a short random string s. For that purpose, Alice and Bob may use a pseudorandom
generator. For a definition and thorough discussion of pseudorandom generators see [5]. Essentially, an
efficiently computable function G is a pseudorandom generator, if (1) G is length increasing (i.e., for every
input its output is longer than its input) and (2) G(x) is computationally indistinguishable from a uniform
string, as long as x is uniformly distributed. In other words G(x) is effectively random. It is known that
the existence of pseudorandom generators is essentially the minimal cryptographic assumption (as it is
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equivalent to the assumption that one-way functions exist). A pseudorandom generator that expands the
length of its input implies a pseudorandom generator with arbitrary polynomial expansion (again, the reader
is referred to [5] for a detailed discussion and references therein).
The relation to our context is now simple: Alice and Bob can exchange a single short secret key s prior
to the communication process. Applying a pseudorandom generator to this single key, they can obtain many
pseudorandom keys G(s) = S1, S2, . . . , Sℓ to be used in repeated executions of Ars (in fact, ℓ need not be
known in advance as it is possible to keep on expanding G’s output on the fly). The proof that such repeated
executions of Ars are still secure is rather immediate from the definition of a pseudorandom generator and
we therefore only sketch it here. For any i, if Si is truly random Calvin will fail the execution of Ars with
very small probability. Assume for the sake of contradiction that this is not the case when Si is taken from
the output of G. This gives a way to distinguish the output of G from random. The distinguisher simply
simulates the repeated execution of Ars (playing the roles of Alice, Bob, internal nodes, and Calvin). Now
if Calvin succeeds then the distinguisher can deduce with non-negligible probability that Si is not truly
random.
Remark 5.1 As discussed in Section 3, the scheme Ars can be extended to the case of multicast. The idea
described here, of replacing the random keys in multiple executions ofArs with pseudorandom keys, applies
in the setting of multicast as well (in that setting, Alice and each one of the Bobs will share a short key that
will be expanded to many pseudorandom keys using the pseudorandom generator).
5.2 Public-key cryptography
A disadvantage of the scheme Ars is that Alice and Bob need to share a common key. In this section we
relax this set up requirement and only ask that Bob holds a pair of keys: a private key (known only to
itself) and a public key (known to all — including Calvin). In such a setup, without Alice and Bob ever
meeting or exchanging private information, we are able to give a network-coding scheme, Apk, against
a computationally-bounded Calvin with very similar parameters to those of Aco (which was given in the
Causal-Omniscient model).
5.3 The scheme Apk
We present a network coding scheme, Apk, for the public-key model, that is very similar to our scheme
for the Causal-Omniscient model. Again, we compose two schemes: A scheme Asc in the secret-channel
model, and a scheme Aomn in the omniscient-adversary model. (See more details on the schemes in Sec-
tion 2.) Alice, Bob (and the network) execute Asc with Alice’s input M , but without Alice sending the secret
message S on the secret channel (simply because a secret channel is not available in this model). We would
like to execute Aomn with S as Alice’s new input. Unfortunately, as in this model all of the information sent
by Alice (i.e., the matrix X in its entirety) is known to Calvin from the start, S will be available to Calvin
during the execution of Asc and the scheme may fail. The solution is simple: instead of sending S, Alice
will first encrypt S using Bob’s public key, and send the encryption to Bob using Aomn. We now describe
our scheme and proof in more detail.
Public-key encryption A central ingredient in building Apk is a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme.
For a thorough discussion of public-key encryptions see [6]. We describe here the relevant definitions for
completeness.
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A PKE scheme gives a way for two parties to communicate securely even though they did not previously
meet and exchange secrets. The scheme is composed of three probabilistic polynomial time algorithms – the
key generating algorithm Gen and the encryption and decryption algorithms Enc and Dec: (1) The input of
Gen is the security parameter k (we will shortly discuss the role of k), and its output is a pair of keys – the
secret key sk and the public key pk (both are of length polynomial in k). (2) The public key pk (which is
known to everyone) is used for encryption. The encryption of a message m is a ciphertext y = Enc(pk,m).
The plaintext m may be of arbitrary length and the length of y is polynomial is the length of m and in k. (3)
The secret key sk allows decryption. For every y as above we have that Dec(sk, y) = m.
The security requirement from a PKE scheme is that a ciphertext y gives no information on the plain-
text m to a computationally bounded adversary. More formally, we will use a PKE scheme which is
semantically-secure against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) [7]. 3 There are various equivalent formaliza-
tions of this security requirement and the one that seems most convenient for us is based on the notion of
indistinguishability. Loosely, this means that no efficient adversary Adv can distinguish an encryption of
a message m0 from an encryption of a message m1, (where Adv is also allowed to select m0 and m1).
In other words, given an encryption y = Enc(pk,mσ), where σ is a uniformly selected bit, an adversary
cannot guess σ with probability significantly better than half. This is exactly where the security parameter k
comes into play: the advantage over half of the adversary in guessing σ is smaller than 1/poly(k) for every
polynomial poly (under stronger assumptions we may require the advantage to be exponentially small in k).
We are now ready to define Apk formally.
Security parameter In this model, the network coding scheme is defined per security parameter k. This
parameter should be chosen as to make the encryption scheme 〈Gen,Enc,Dec〉 secure enough. As the
errors we seek are of the order of 1/n, it is enough to take k < nα for some small constant α > 0 (under
stronger assumptions, k may even be logarithmic in n). This will imply that all the ciphertexts used in our
scheme are of negligible length compared with n (e.g. smaller than nα′ for any α′ > 0 of our choosing).
Bob’s keys Bob runs Gen and gets as output the pair (sk, pk). Bob publishes pk as his public key and
saves his secret key sk.
Alice’s encoder Alice invokes the encoding and secret generating algorithms of Asc on her input M .
Denote by XM the output of the encoding and S the message to be sent on the secret channel. Alice invokes
Enc(pk, S) and gets as output Y . Now Alice invokes (using fresh randomness) the encoding algorithm of
Aomn on Y as input. Denote by XS the output of the encoding. Alice now outputs X = [XM XS ]. As in
Section 4 we will pad XS if necessary to ensure that it has block length nS = (n/C)1/3.
Network coding As in Asc and Aomn, the network coding is the standard random-linear coding.
Bob’s decoding Bob first uses the decoder of Aomn on the suffix of the communication (which corre-
sponds to the columns of XS). Denote by Y¯ the decoded message. Bob invokes Dec(sk, Y¯ ), and receives
S¯ as output. Bob now applies the decoder of Asc on the prefix of the communication (which corresponds to
the columns of XM ), with the secret message set to S¯. Bob outputs the decoded message, which we denote
by M¯ .
3In Remark 5.3 we note that in some cases one may choose to require security against chosen-ciphertext attack (CCA security).
14
5.4 Properties of Apk
We state the parameters obtained by Apk in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.2 Apk is a distributed polynomial-time scheme. Apk achieves a rate of C − z, as long as
C > 2z, in the public-key model, with code-complexity O(nC2).
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 4.1, most of the properties ofApk follow from the related properties
of Asc and Aomn, as given by Theorems 2.2 and 2.1.
It remains to bound the error probability ǫ of Apk. Obviously, ǫ ≤ ǫ1 + ǫ2, where ǫ1 is the probability
that Y¯ 6= Y while ǫ2 is the probability that Y¯ = Y but M¯ 6= M . As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, it is
not hard to argue that ǫ1 is bounded by the error probability of Aomn (when applied to messages of block
length nS). We would now like to argue that ǫ2 is bounded by the error probability of Asc (when applied to
messages of block length corresponding to XM ). This will turn out to be correct up to a negligible additional
error (which relates to the security property of the PKE scheme).
To bound ǫ2 we must argue that Calvin cannot use the encryption Y of S to increase his probability
of corrupting the communication between Alice and Bob. Intuitively, this is clear - as the encryption S is
computationally sound. However, to prove our argument formally, we need to present our claim under the
sole assumption that our encryption is secure against a chosen-plaintext attack. To this end, we condition on
the fact that Y¯ = Y (and hence Bob knows S) and show that a successful Calvin in our setting will imply
a successful Calvin in an imaginary setting in which Bob is given S (e.g., via a side channel) and the value
of XS transmitted over the network is the encoding of an all zero message. This in turn, implies that Calvin
can corrupt the original secret-channel protocol Asc of [12], a contradiction. We now sketch the details.
Let Calvin be an adversary that causes Y¯ = Y and M¯ 6= M in an execution of Apk, with probability ǫ2.
As a mental experiment assume that Bob’s decoder receives S as an additional input. Bob can then ignore Y¯
and simply invoke the decoder of Asc. In this experiment we have that the probability that Calvin manages
to cause Y¯ = Y but M¯ 6= M is still ǫ2. This follows immediately from the properties of a PKE scheme (as
if Y¯ = Y we also have that S¯ = S).
Further revising this mental experiment, let us now assume that Alice defines Y as the encryption of the
zero-message (or any other fixed message), rather than the encryption of S. It is not hard to argue that in
this case, the probability that Calvin causes M¯ 6= M is at least ǫ2−neg(k) where neg(·) is some negligible
function (that is asymptotically smaller than 1/poly(·) for every polynomial poly(·)). If this is not the case
then we can easily devise an adversary Adv that breaks the security of the PKE scheme. Adv will simulate
all parties of the network-coding scheme (Alice, Bob, Calvin and the internal nodes). When Alice generates
S then Adv will set m1 = S and will set m0 to be the all-zero message. Adv then receives y which is an
encryption of one of these messages. Adv can now continue the simulation of the network-coding scheme
with Y = y. Finally, when the simulation is over, Adv will output one if M¯ 6= M and zero otherwise.
Summing up, we have an adversary Calvin that causes M¯ 6= M with probability ǫ′
2
= ǫ2−neg(k), in the
revised mental experiment based onApk. Note that in this mental experiment XS is completely independent
of S. Therefore, it is possible to define an adversary Calvin’ that fails Asc with probability ǫ′2 by simulating
the attack of Calvin in the setting of the mental experiment. The theorem therefore follows.
Remark 5.3 In the definition of Apk we used a PKE scheme which is secure against a chosen-plaintext
attack. We proved that one invocation of Apk works when the public-key is only used for this invocation.
In case the same public-key is used many times, and especially if it used for messages sent from different
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senders it may be safer to use a PKE scheme that is secure against a chosen-ciphertext attack (see [6] for
more information).
The case of multicast In the above description of Apk, we considered for simplicity the case of a single
Bob. The scheme can be extended to the setting of multicast, in a similar manner to the extension of Ars
to multicast (see discussion in Section 3). In fact the extension is a bit simpler in the case of Ars as we
describe now.
We assume that the i’th receiver knows a pair consisting of a secret key ski and public key pki. The
public key is known to everyone including Alice. Now, for every i, Alice will transmit (using Aomn) the
pair (pki, Yi), where Yi = Enc(pki, S) (recall that in the basic scheme, Alice transmits a single Y ). Based
on the properties of Aomn we can assume that each of the Bobs correctly retrieves all of the pairs. The
ith receiver can decode Yi (which corresponds to its public key pki) and continue the decoding of M as in
the basic scheme. To argue that with high probability each one of the Bobs will decode Alice’s message
M correctly, we note that the concatenation of all the different encryptions of S still does not reveal any
information on S.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced three adversarial models and have argued that (1) The models may be
realistic. (2) The models are useful in the sense that they allow non-trivial improvements in the parameters of
network coding schemes. We feel that this calls for more attention into the assumptions regarding adversarial
limitations and set-up assumptions that apply in “real life” scenarios. Are the models suggested here indeed
applicable? Are there any other realistic and useful models to consider?
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